一、逐段翻译与解析
第1段
Many of the notions on which philosophy has traditionally depended came under attack in the late twentieth century. French post-structuralists assailed the notion of human nature, Rawlsian liberals refused to engage with substantive conceptions of the good life and postcolonial theorists questioned the Western-imperial presumptions of the idea of progress. The delicate task that the critical theorist Rahel Jaeggi has set herself is to see how such ideas might be salvaged—reimagined in less dogmatic, suppler form. Her latest work addresses the concept of progress, which she acknowledges to be highly problematic; not only does it have an ignominious history as the optimistic justification for liberal imperialism, but a glance at the world makes it hard to think that any type of progress is taking place. Nonetheless its conceptual counterpart, regression, is if anything gaining momentum, Jaeggi notes: autocratic leaders are often accused of democratic 'backsliding', reverting to earlier political stages or reversing hard-won gains. Disavowing the idea of progress while 'unreflectively clinging' to its opposite, Jaeggi argues, risks a kind of bad faith. Her short book Progress and Regression, ably translated from the German by Robert Savage, is a defence of both as 'crucial conceptual tools'—indispensable for broaching 'what was once a fundamental concern of Critical Theory: investigating the causes, driving forces, character and underlying laws of the social transformation process, including social revolutions'.
哲学传统上所依赖的诸多概念，在二十世纪后期遭到了攻击。法国后结构主义者抨击了人性概念，罗尔斯式自由主义者拒绝介入关于良善生活的实质性观念，而后殖民理论家则质疑了进步观念中所蕴含的西方-帝国预设。批判理论家拉埃尔·耶吉（Rahel Jaeggi）为自己设定的微妙任务是，考察如何挽救这些理念——以更少教条、更为灵活的形式重新构想它们。她的最新著作处理的是进步概念，她承认这一概念极具问题性：它不仅有着作为自由帝国主义之乐观辩护的不光彩历史，而且放眼世界，很难认为任何类型的进步正在发生。然而，耶吉指出，其概念上的对应物——退步——若有什么变化的话，倒是在获得势头：威权领导人常被指控民主"倒退"，回归早期的政治阶段或逆转来之不易的成果。耶吉论证道，在拒斥进步观念的同时"不加反思地依附"于其对立面，有一种不诚实的风险。她这本由罗伯特·萨维奇从德文出色翻译的小书《进步与退步》，是对二者的辩护，视之为"关键的概念工具"——对于开启"批判理论曾经关注的一个根本问题：考察社会转型过程的起因、驱动力、特征和潜在规律，包括社会革命"不可或缺。
解析本段为全文定调：先勾勒二十世纪后期三大思潮（后结构主义、罗尔斯式自由主义、后殖民理论）对哲学传统概念的围攻，再引出耶吉"挽救"这些概念的独特姿态。书名"Norm Smuggling?"（规范走私？）的深意在此初现端倪：耶吉试图在不引入外在规范的前提下重建进步概念。关键张力在于：耶吉承认进步有"不光彩历史"且现实难以辨识进步，却坚持其概念不可或缺。她以"退步"反衬"进步"——既然我们仍使用"倒退"等词，就暗中已承诺了进步标准。这一论证策略巧妙但可疑，为全文批判埋下伏笔。
第2段
Jaeggi, born in 1966, can be counted as a fourth-generation thinker in the Frankfurt critical-theory tradition. She grew up for the most part in the scholarly-bohemian Cold War enclave of West Berlin, where her parents taught at the Freie Universität. Her father, a Swiss-born sociologist, sculptor and painter, was the author of a damning study of the post-war German political elite, Macht und Herrschaft in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1969) and supervised Rudi Dutschke's thesis; her mother, an Austrian-born psychoanalyst, wrote many popular books on psychology. Jaeggi herself also studied at the Freie Universität, writing her Master's dissertation on Hannah Arendt, before spending five years working with Axel Honneth in Frankfurt. Since 2009, she has been a professor of philosophy at Humboldt University. Progress and Regression deploys a theoretical approach that Jaeggi has honed across a number of books. Her first monograph, Alienation (2005), based on her doctoral thesis, was an attempt to 'resurrect the concept' and defend its 'legitimacy'. Jaeggi took the post-structuralist critique of alienation seriously—above all, the charge that it relied on an unproblematic essentialism—and tried to re-ground the concept by offering a critical reconstruction of its foundations.
耶吉生于1966年，可算作法兰克福批判理论传统的第四代思想家。她大部分时间在西柏林这一学者-波西米亚式的冷战飞地中长大，父母均在自由大学任教。她的父亲是瑞士裔社会学家、雕塑家和画家，曾著有对战后德国政治精英的严厉研究《德意志联邦共和国的权力与统治》（1969），并指导过鲁迪·杜奇克的论文；母亲是奥地利裔精神分析师，撰写过许多心理学通俗读物。耶吉本人也就读于自由大学，以关于汉娜·阿伦特的论文获得硕士学位，随后在法兰克福与阿克塞尔·霍耐特共事五年。自2009年起，她一直担任洪堡大学哲学教授。《进步与退步》运用了耶吉在多部著作中打磨出的理论进路。她的第一部专著《异化》（2005）基于其博士论文，试图"复活这一概念"并捍卫其"合法性"。耶吉认真对待后结构主义对异化的批评——尤其是它依赖于一种未被问题化的本质主义的指控——并试图通过对该概念基础的批判性重建来为其重新奠基。
解析本段勾勒耶吉的学术谱系与思想成形。将其定位为"第四代"法兰克福学派至关重要：若以霍克海默、阿多诺为第一代，哈贝马斯为第二代，霍耐特为第三代，耶吉代表该传统在新世纪的延续与转型。她特殊的家庭背景（社会学+精神分析）预示了其日后综合马克思主义与精神分析的取向。"波西米亚式冷战飞地"的西柏林成长环境，亦暗示她承继了1968一代的批判精神。《异化》的策略——认真对待后结构主义批评并以"批判性重建"回应——是其全部著作的方法论原型：不抛弃被质疑的概念，而是重新奠基。这一"挽救式"姿态直接通向《进步与退步》。
第3段
In her next book, Critique of Forms of Life (2013), Jaeggi turned to the philosophical problem of the 'good life'. Not only Rawls but Habermas had argued for 'ethical abstinence' on this key Socratic question, on the grounds of the irreducible ethico-cultural pluralism of modern societies, towards which the liberal state should be neutral. For Jaeggi, this was to consign the unavoidably social question of more or less productive, or desirable, forms of life to a matter of private preference. Defining 'forms of life' as ensembles of social practices and 'problem-solving processes', she proposed a critical framework that would immanently assess such practices. A successful form of life, Jaeggi argued, will find 'the appropriate solution' to the problem it confronts, and will exhibit learning, self-understanding and an 'ability to deal rationally with crises'. The point is not to develop an abstract, prescriptive conception of the right form of life, once and for all, but rather to find a way to distinguish forms which succeed from those which fall short. 'Failing forms of life suffer from a collective practical reflexive deficit, from a blockage to learning', Jaeggi concluded. She followed this with a book-length dialogue with Nancy Fraser, published as Capitalism: A Conversation in Critical Theory in 2018, just as Critique of Forms of Life appeared in English.
在下一部著作《生活形式批判》（2013）中，耶吉转向了"良善生活"这一苏格拉底式哲学问题。不仅罗尔斯，连哈贝马斯都主张在这一关键问题上保持"伦理克制"，理由是现代社会存在不可化约的伦理-文化多元主义，自由主义国家应保持中立。在耶吉看来，这等于把或多或少具有生产力或可欲性的生活形式这一不可避免的社会问题，交由私人偏好来裁决。她将"生活形式"界定为社会实践与"问题解决过程"的集合，并提出一个可对其内在评估的批判框架。耶吉论证道，一种成功的生活形式会为其所面对的问题找到"恰当的解答"，并展现出学习、自我理解和"理性地应对危机的能力"。关键不在于一劳永逸地发展出一种抽象的、规范性的正确生活形式，而在于找到一种方法来区分成功的生活形式与有所欠缺的生活形式。"失败的生活形式遭受着一种集体性的实践反思缺陷，遭受着学习的阻塞"，耶吉总结道。随后她与南希·弗雷泽进行了一次书长对话，于2018年以《资本主义：批判理论中的对话》为题出版，恰逢《生活形式批判》英文版面世。
解析本段呈现耶吉思想的核心概念"生活形式"及其批判方法。她对罗尔斯与哈贝马斯共同持有的"伦理克制"提出挑战，认为将良善生活问题私人化是逃避批判责任。关键创新在于将生活形式定义为"问题解决过程"，并以"内在评估"取代外在规范——这一策略正是《进步与退步》中"内在标准"方法的雏形。"失败的生活形式遭受学习的阻塞"这一论断，直接预示了后来"退步"概念中"去学习"的定义。与弗雷泽的对话则显示她并不回避资本主义这一宏观结构问题。整体看，耶吉构建的是一种"功能性"批判：不问生活形式是否符合先验理想，而问它能否解决自身面临的问题。
第4段
The approach that Jaeggi has been developing straddles philosophical traditions, combining her Frankfurt School inheritance with Anglo-American influences. Progress and Regression could be seen as a synthesis of Western Marxism, pragmatism and psychoanalysis; its touchstones are Hegel, Marx and Adorno as well as Freud and Dewey. Typically, these approaches are not easily combined. A Marxist commitment to structural dynamics can be at odds with the pragmatist insistence on contingency. Whereas psychoanalysis insists on the presence of the past, pragmatism prioritizes future experimentation. Psychoanalysis's concern with the individual psyche is not always compatible with the Marxist emphasis on social conditions and historical change. Progress and Regression represents a courageous attempt to resolve these tensions. In the process, Jaeggi provides her own reformulation of three classic Marxist contrasts, reconsidered through a pragmatist and psychoanalytic lens: reform/revolution, base/superstructure, socialism/barbarism.
耶吉一直发展的进路横跨哲学传统，将她的法兰克福学派传承与英美影响结合起来。《进步与退步》可被视为西方马克思主义、实用主义与精神分析的综合；其基准点是黑格尔、马克思和阿多诺，以及弗洛伊德和杜威。通常，这些进路不易结合。马克思主义对结构动力的承诺与实用主义对偶然性的坚持可能相互冲突。精神分析坚持过去的持存，而实用主义优先考虑未来的实验。精神分析对个体心灵的关注与马克思主义对社会条件和历史变迁的强调并非总是兼容。《进步与退步》代表了一次解决这些张力的勇敢尝试。在此过程中，耶吉提供了对三组经典马克思主义对比的重新表述，透过实用主义和精神分析的透镜重新审视：改良/革命、基础/上层建筑、社会主义/野蛮。
解析本段点明全书的方法论雄心：综合西方马克思主义、实用主义与精神分析三大传统。作者敏锐指出三者之间的内在张力——结构动力vs偶然性、过去的持存vs未来实验、个体心灵vs社会条件。耶吉选择以三组马克思主义经典对立（改良/革命、基础/上层建筑、社会主义/野蛮）作为重构载体，显示她并非简单折衷，而是试图在张力中生成新概念。这一综合是否成功，恰是全书的关键悬念。"勇敢"一词既肯定其志向，也暗示风险。值得注意的是，耶吉将杜威与黑格尔、马克思并列，表明她试图为批判理论注入实用主义的问题解决取向。
第5段
In grasping something as progress, Jaeggi writes, we set historical and social events in a relation to each other that we purport to evaluate and understand. In her terms, progress is a 'process concept', both interpretive and reflective—one of those through which a society comes to communicate about and understand itself: why, and in what way, do we understand change to be for the better? Drawing on Reinhart Koselleck's essay, '"Progress" and "Decline": An Appendix to the History of Two Concepts', Jaeggi begins by identifying four characteristic features of the 'progress' narrative—'distillations of its problems and possibilities'—that will guide her attempt to reconstruct it. First is the Enlightenment notion that scientific, social, moral, intellectual and political advance are part of a single, all-encompassing dynamic—'interlinked as if by an unbreakable chain', as Steven Lukes put it. Second, the understanding of progress as an irresistible and impersonal historical force, the execution of what is 'timely', as Hegel would say. Third, the idea that it is evolutionary, proceeding through a series of necessary steps—as in Turgot's formulation, so influential in the Enlightenment era and beyond, which imagines that the human race, like an individual, has its childhood and its developmental progress. And finally, the notion that progress proceeds in a linear and cumulative fashion, producing gains without much loss.
耶吉写道，在把某事物把握为进步时，我们将历史与社会事件置于一种我们声称要评估和理解的关系之中。用她的话说，进步是一个"过程概念"，既是解释性的又是反思性的——是那种社会借以沟通和理解自身的概念之一：为什么，以及以何种方式，我们认为变化是向好的？借鉴莱因哈特·科泽勒克的论文《"进步"与"衰落"：两个概念史的附录》，耶吉首先识别出"进步"叙事的四个特征——"其问题与可能性的蒸馏"——以指导她重建这一概念的尝试。第一是启蒙运动关于科学、社会、道德、智识和政治进步属于单一、包罗万象之动力的观念——如史蒂文·卢克斯所言，"如同被一条牢不可破的链条般联结在一起"。第二，将进步理解为一种不可抗拒的非人格历史力量，执行黑格尔所说的"应时之物"。第三，它是进化性的，通过一系列必要步骤推进——正如启蒙时代及之后影响深远的杜尔哥的表述所设想的，人类种族如同个体，有其童年及其发展进程。最后，进步以线性和累积的方式推进，产生收益而几乎无损失。
解析本段引入耶吉的核心方法论装置：将进步界定为"过程概念"，兼具解释性与反思性。这一界定至关重要——它意味着进步不是客观事实，而是社会自我理解的媒介。引用科泽勒克的概念史研究，显示耶吉遵循法兰克福学派对概念的历史化处理传统。四个特征（整体联动、非人格必然、进化阶段、线性累积）实际上是对启蒙进步观的"理想型"刻画，也即她将要逐一解构的对象。值得注意的是，这四特征恰好对应后来的批评：整体联动被技术-社会脱钩证伪，必然性被偶然性挑战，进化论被指为族裔中心主义，累积论被副作用证伪。结构极为工整。
第6段
As Progress and Regression notes, these features have long been subject to legitimate criticism. Technoscientific advances do not necessarily go hand in hand with welcome social change (think only of the diminution of attention that has resulted from the smartphone). Given that progress requires that people act, it is always subject to some contingency. Evolutionary accounts of progress have historically set up a hierarchy between the West and the rest and so are compromised by what Jaeggi calls 'ethnocentrism and false, ideological-parochial universalization'. And finally, it is plain that every advance entails unrealized alternatives and ambivalent knock-on consequences (though we may enjoy satellite navigation, we have lost geographic literacy).
正如《进步与退步》所指出的，这些特征长期受到正当批评。技术科学进步未必与可欲的社会变迁相伴（只需想想智能手机所导致的注意力衰减）。鉴于进步需要人去行动，它总受制于某种偶然性。关于进步的进化论叙述在历史上建立了西方与其他地区之间的等级，因此被耶吉所称的"族裔中心主义和虚假的、意识形态-狭隘的普遍化"所损害。最后，显而易见每一次进步都伴随着未实现的替代方案和矛盾的连锁后果（尽管我们享受卫星导航，却失去了地理素养）。
解析本段逐一回应四特征的合法批评，构成对启蒙进步观的系统性解构。作者巧妙选择例证：智能手机损害注意力（反驳整体联动）、卫星导航与地理素养的得失（反驳累积论）。这些例证贴近当代经验，增强了论证说服力。耶吉将进化论进步观定性为"族裔中心主义"，呼应后殖民批评，但她的策略不是否定进步而是重建它。"进步需要人去行动故有偶然性"这一论断尤为关键，它为后文以"处境化行动者"取代"非人格历史力量"铺路。四特征被逐一拆解后，重建的工作才真正展开。
第7段
Any rehabilitation of progress will need to address these criticisms. But why revive it at all? Why should we not, with Foucault, eschew this contested rubric? Jaeggi's answer is twofold. Not only has the critique of progress often been even more politically dubious—consider, for example, the romantic nostalgia present in early fascism—but some such notion is indispensable for evaluating social developments and struggles. Jaeggi describes progress as an 'ethically thick concept', with a 'normatively founding character', like 'alienation' or 'kitsch'. When we use such words, we are not simply describing, we are judging—and it is this dual character which gives them their 'specific interpretative power'. To understand the logic of social change at all, Jaeggi suggests, some idea of progress is necessary. How then should it be reframed?
任何对进步的复原都需要回应这些批评。但为什么要复兴它呢？为什么我们不能像福柯那样避开这一充满争议的名目？耶吉的回答是双重的。不仅对进步的批评本身往往在政治上更为可疑——例如早期法西斯主义中存在的浪漫怀旧——而且某种此类观念对于评估社会发展和斗争是不可或缺的。耶吉将进步描述为一个"伦理上厚重的概念"，具有"规范上奠基性的特征"，如同"异化"或"媚俗"。当我们使用这类词语时，我们并非仅仅在描述，我们也在判断——正是这种双重特性赋予它们"特有的解释力"。耶吉建议，要理解社会变迁的逻辑，某种进步观念是必要的。那么应当如何重新框定它呢？
解析本段是全书论证的关键转折：从解构转向重建。耶吉给出复兴进步的两个理由——批评本身政治可疑（以早期法西斯主义的浪漫怀旧为证），以及进步概念不可或缺。将进步归为"伦理上厚重的概念"是重要的理论动作：借鉴伯纳德·威廉斯等人的"厚重伦理概念"理论，她赋予进步以描述与评价的双重功能。与"异化""媚俗"并置，显示这类概念的共同结构。但作者暗示这一论证有循环之嫌：正因为"进步"是厚概念，才难以在不引入规范的情况下使用它——而这恰是"规范走私"质疑的起点。福柯的对照则突显耶吉与后结构主义的根本分歧。
第8段
Rather than an 'unbreakable chain', Progress and Regression proposes a versatile materialist approach that would capture 'the complex network of mutual influences and interdependences between economic, social, cultural and political practices'—not so much an iron chain as 'a ball of twine with many loose threads'. Instead of an impersonal historical force, she offers an updated version of Hegel's 'world-historical subject', in the form of situated actors who know how to seize the right moment; here she intends to 'steer a course between teleology and contingency'—to avoid both fatalism, which denies historical actors any role, and voluntarism, according to which anything is possible. Rather than progress as an evolutionary tale, unfolding towards a pre-ordained objective, she sees it as a set of locally specific problem-solving processes. 'Societies do not have goals, they solve problems' is one of the refrains of the book, and their degree of progress or regression is determined by the quality of their solutions. Following the British philosopher Philip Kitcher, Jaeggi conceives of progress less as approaching a given aim ('progress toward') than as moving beyond a given problem ('progress from').
《进步与退步》提出的不是一条"牢不可破的链条"，而是一种灵活的唯物主义进路，用以捕捉"经济、社会、文化和政治实践之间相互影响与相互依赖的复杂网络"——与其说是铁链，不如说是"一个有许多松散线头的线团"。取代非人格历史力量的，是她提供的黑格尔"世界历史主体"的更新版本，形式上是懂得如何抓住恰当时机的处境化行动者；她在此意图"在目的论与偶然性之间航行"——既避免否认历史行动者作用的决定论，也避免认为一切皆有可能的唯意志论。取代朝向预定目标展开的进化叙事，她将进步视为一组局部特定的问题解决过程。"社会没有目标，它们解决问题"是全书反复出现的主题之一，而其进步或退步的程度由其解决方案的质量决定。追随英国哲学家菲利普·基切尔，耶吉将进步设想为与其说是接近某一给定目标（"朝向的进步"），不如说是超越某一给定问题（"脱离的进步"）。
解析本段呈现耶吉对四特征的前三项重构。"线团"隐喻取代"铁链"，强调相互依赖而非线性因果；"处境化行动者"取代"世界历史主体"，在目的论与唯意志论间航行；"问题解决"取代"进化阶段"。"社会没有目标，它们解决问题"是全书纲领性命题，直接来自杜威式实用主义。"朝向的进步"与"脱离的进步"之分（源自基切尔）尤为精妙：它使进步摆脱了目的论终点，转而以"摆脱困境"来衡量。这一转换是耶吉"通缩"策略的核心——把进步从宏大的历史哲学概念降格为局部的、功能性的问题解决评估。但问题在于：何为"问题"本身已预设了价值判断。
第9段
Finally, instead of presuming a cumulative model without losses, Jaeggi suggests that 'every change is accompanied by side-effects—sometimes unexpected or unforeseeable—that can be negative, or even fatal, without for that reason discrediting the change itself'. Such side-effects are not 'irrevocably bound up with progress itself'. Technological advances that save labour can also be socially isolating, but we are not doomed to this combination: 'If we wanted to keep both the washing machine and a spirit of neighbourliness, appliances could be socialized by setting up communal laundries'. Moving from the optimistic eighteenth-century articulation of the concept through its postmodern pessimistic critique, Jaeggi attempts to retrieve what she describes as a 'non-teleological, pragmatist-materialist, pluralist concept of progress'.
最后，取代假定无损失的累积模型，耶吉建议"每一次变化都伴随着副作用——有时是意料之外或不可预见的——它们可能是负面的，甚至致命的，但并不因此而使变化本身失信"。这些副作用并非"不可撤销地与进步本身绑定"。节省劳动的技术进步也可能造成社会孤立，但我们并非注定要承受这一组合："如果我们想同时保留洗衣机和邻里精神，可以通过设立公共洗衣房使家电社会化"。从十八世纪对这一概念的乐观表述，经由其后的后现代悲观批评，耶吉试图挽救她所描述的"一种非目的论的、实用主义-唯物主义的、多元主义的进步概念"。
解析本段处理第四特征（累积无损失）的重构，引出"副作用"概念。耶吉的关键论点是：副作用并非进步本身所固有，故可被社会重组所化解。"洗衣机与邻里精神"的例子极具启发性——它表明技术进步的负面后果可通过制度设计（公共洗衣房）来缓解，而非否定进步本身。这一立场既区别于技术乐观主义，也区别于后现代悲观主义，体现了耶吉"第三条道路"的特征。最终概括的"非目的论、实用主义-唯物主义、多元主义"三元定语，是全书概念重构的目标蓝图。"挽救"一词则呼应第一段的方法论姿态。
第10段
Progress and Regression considers several theories of moral progress—including those of Richard Rorty, Elizabeth Anderson, Peter Singer and Kwame Anthony Appiah—allowing Jaeggi to mark out her own materialist position, which situates moral progress in the broader social world. Here she elaborates her definition of progress as a process concept, as opposed to a substantive one, denoting not a specific change but 'the form of change'—the character of the developmental process itself. Jaeggi discerns a parallel in the philosophy of science, which has questioned whether to prioritize 'progress' over 'truth' as a way to understand advances. In both cases, we are no longer dependent on an idea of moving towards an unchanging ideal, whether the 'good' or the 'true'. Even in the case of technology, Jaeggi argues, it is rare that a final fixed goal is in sight. Cave dwellers did not dream of skyscrapers. Instead, the skyscraper was born as a solution to a particular problem in a particular place: space was in short supply in Manhattan and the bedrock was solid enough to withstand the experiment. Once reconceived in this fashion, progress, she hopes, can present an alternative horizon for evaluating change. Such a conception is intended to avoid both a universalism that imposes a priori norms and a relativism according to which there is no overarching framework to deem one social transformation preferable to another. Jaeggi's search for 'immanent criteria' here is part of her project to preserve the possibility of social critique 'across contexts', without invoking absolute standards. Progress and Regression is in this sense both a rehabilitation of progress and what Jaeggi later refers to as a deflation of it—a formalization of the concept that leaves its content open-ended.
《进步与退步》考察了几种道德进步理论——包括理查德·罗蒂、伊丽莎白·安德森、彼得·辛格和夸梅·安东尼·阿皮亚的理论——使耶吉得以标定自己的唯物主义立场，将道德进步置于更广阔的社会世界中。在此她阐发了将进步定义为过程概念而非实质性概念的主张，表示的不是某一具体变化，而是"变化的形式"——发展过程本身的特征。耶吉在科学哲学中察觉到一个平行现象：科学哲学已质疑是否应优先以"进步"而非"真理"来理解进展。在两种情形中，我们都不再依赖于朝向不变理想——无论是"善"还是"真"——移动的观念。即便在技术领域，耶吉论证道，罕见地有最终固定目标在望。穴居人并不梦想摩天大楼。相反，摩天大楼作为对特定地点特定问题的解决方案而诞生：曼哈顿空间紧缺，而基岩足够坚实以承受这一实验。一旦以这种方式重新构想，进步，她希望，可以呈现为评估变化的替代性视域。这一构想意在既避免施加先验规范的普遍主义，也避免认为没有凌驾性框架可判定一种社会转型优于另一种的相对主义。耶吉在此寻求"内在标准"，是她"跨语境"保存社会批判可能性之计划的一部分，而不诉诸绝对标准。《进步与退步》在这个意义上既是对进步的复原，也是耶吉后来所称的对进步的通缩——一种将其内容保持开放的概念形式化。
解析本段引入道德进步理论与科学哲学的平行，是全书论证的重要扩展。耶吉将进步严格界定为"变化的形式"而非"具体变化"，这一形式化是"通缩"策略的核心。摩天大楼之例精彩：它说明进步目标是在具体问题情境中生成的，而非先验预设的，与穴居人不梦想摩天大楼的论证形成对目的论的有力反驳。但作者在此埋下伏笔："内在标准"的寻求正是"规范走私"质疑的靶心——若不诉诸绝对标准，"内在"的界限何在？"复原"与"通缩"的双重性本身构成张力：既要保留进步的批判力，又要避免其独断性。科学哲学中"进步vs真理"的对照则显示耶吉借鉴了库恩以后的科学哲学转向。
第11段
Jaeggi's re-definition is set against two prevailing approaches. The first, championed by Singer and Michael Walzer, sees moral progress as an enlargement of our sense of who counts as a bearer of dignity, a gradual process of epistemic correction towards greater inclusivity, often via empathetic identification. Jaeggi's suspicion of this view is twofold: she rejects the condescension implicit in the presumption of a 'we' who deign to fold in new members; and she argues that this definition cannot explain how new normative principles are generated. On this model, the principles remain broadly continuous; only their application evolves. But history offers many examples of what we would typically describe as moral progress that did not work this way. Jaeggi also distinguishes herself from the neo-Hegelian view, expounded in the work of Honneth and Habermas, in which progress is a 'qualitative deepening' of an existing norm, manifested in its 'institutional implementation'. For Habermas, the Enlightenment principles of equality and freedom hold a 'normative surplus' for the future; progress happens when we make good on the implicit potential of these shared ideas. Thus marriage, for example, has become less a relation of patriarchal ownership and more a union between equals, of any gender combination. In this process, more of the latent promise of marriage has been realized.
耶吉的重新定义是对照两种流行进路而确立的。第一种由辛格和迈克尔·沃尔泽倡导，将道德进步视为我们关于谁算作尊严承载者的意识的扩展，一种朝向更大包容性的渐进认识论纠偏过程，常通过移情认同实现。耶吉对这一观点的怀疑是双重的：她拒绝一种"我们"屈尊纳入新成员这一预设中所隐含的居高临下；她论证这一定义无法解释新的规范原则如何生成。在这一模型中，原则大致保持连续，只有其应用在演化。但历史提供了许多我们通常描述为道德进步的例子，它们并非如此运作。耶吉还与新黑格尔主义的观点相区别，后者在霍耐斯和哈贝马斯的著作中得到阐述，将进步视为某一现存规范的"质性深化"，体现于其"制度性落实"。对哈贝马斯而言，启蒙运动的平等与自由原则对将来持有"规范剩余"；当我们兑现这些共享理念的隐含潜能时，进步便发生了。因此，例如婚姻已较少是父权所有制的关系，而更多是平等者之间的结合，不论何种性别组合。在这一过程中，婚姻更多的潜在承诺得以实现。
解析本段铺陈耶吉所对立的两种道德进步理论。第一种（辛格/沃尔泽）是"包容性扩展"模型，耶吉两点批评切中要害：居高临下的"我们"姿态，以及无法解释新规范之生成。这一批评实际上揭示了自由主义进步观的保守内核——它假定规范框架已定，只需扩展适用范围。第二种（霍耐斯/哈贝马斯）是新黑格尔主义的"规范剩余"模型，强调启蒙原则的隐含潜能逐步实现。婚姻平权的例子是这一模型的典型应用。值得注意的是，耶吉同时与自己的学术传承（霍耐斯是她导师）保持距离，显示其理论独立性。她倾向于第二种但仍有不满，为后文的"新规范如何生成"问题做铺垫。
第12段
Jaeggi is closer to this second conception, which she argues is more dynamic and dialectical, since 'as they are progressively realized, these ideals themselves undergo a transformation'; the principle of marriage changes as it takes new concrete forms. She nonetheless argues that this framework fails to explain how new norms arise and are able to 'claim validity'. How did the principles of equality and freedom first take root? In Jaeggi's view, the notion of 'a clean break with the past' may not be historically coherent: any new principle gains a foothold in part by being couched in old terms. Even the French Revolution, she argues, 'was not a complete rupture' but 'drew on old customs': 'revolution is always also restitution'. The revolutionaries may have established a new calendar, but they began the process by calling an Estates-General: 'an established, albeit historically neglected institution'. They carried out a radical transformation through familiar institutional norms. In this sense, we need not oppose reform to revolution: 'there is no need—indeed, it is not even possible—to decide in advance whether or not a (progressively emancipatory) process of social transformation moves within an established normative framework'.
耶吉更接近这第二种构想，她论证它更具动态性和辩证性，因为"随着它们被逐步实现，这些理想本身也经历转化"；婚姻原则随着它采取新的具体形式而改变。然而她仍论证这一框架无法解释新规范如何产生并能够"声称有效性"。平等与自由的原则最初是如何扎根的？在耶吉看来，"与过去彻底决裂"的观念可能在历史上并不连贯：任何新原则部分地借由以旧术语来表达而获得立足点。即便是法国大革命，她论证道，"也并非一次完全的断裂"，而是"汲取了旧习俗"："革命总也是恢复"。革命者或许建立了新历法，但他们以召集三级会议开始这一过程："一个既有的、尽管在历史上被忽视的制度"。他们通过熟悉的制度规范实施了激进转型。在这个意义上，我们无需将改良与革命对立："没有必要——甚至不可能——预先判定一个（渐进解放的）社会转型过程是否在一个既有的规范框架内运作"。
解析本段是耶吉与霍耐斯/哈贝马斯分歧的核心所在。她虽更认同新黑格尔主义的动态辩证性，但指出其根本缺陷：无法解释新规范的"有效性声称"之起源。"革命总也是恢复"这一论断极为深刻，它解构了革命与传统的二元对立。法国大革命以三级会议为起点而非凭空创造，说明激进变革必须借既有制度形式来推进。由此推出改良与革命不可预先区分——这一立场实际上重写了伯恩斯坦与卢森堡之争。"理想在被实现中转化"则呼应黑格尔精神现象学的辩证法：内容在形式化中改变自身。但问题在于：若新规范必须以旧术语表达，那么"新"的界限何在？这一灰色地带恰是"规范走私"的可能空间。
第13段
This account of the French Revolution leads Jaeggi to argue that changes in ideas and attitudes are always embedded in changes to our 'form of ethical life'. Jaeggi dwells on a line in Capital: 'From the standpoint of a higher socioeconomic formation, the private property of particular individuals in the earth will appear just as tasteless as the private property of one man in other men.' The primacy Marx accords socioeconomic changes as precipitating shifts in ideas, Jaeggi notes, coheres with the base-superstructure model developed in his 1859 Preface. While wanting to preserve Marx's materialism, Jaeggi distances herself from the causal prioritization implicit in this metaphor. Changes 'in our moral imagination . . . arise and solidify in tandem with other social changes', she argues. Here Progress and Regression also parts ways with Rorty, for whom a shift like the one that made slavery seem 'tasteless' is less a question of socioeconomic change than of transformed sensibilities, which requires a sentimental education. Jaeggi likewise distinguishes herself from Anderson, who frames the abolition of slavery as the result of a historical process of contention over moral principles. Keen to resist both narrowly deterministic and excessively idealist understandings of change, Jaeggi writes: the change in our evaluation of institutions and practices described as moral progress does not result from a free-floating moral insight or a solitary engagement of moral empathy. It is the effect of a sea change in entire social formations, a shift in surrounding or neighbouring practices and the interpretive horizon within which the morally relevant practices and convictions in question have taken shape and come to prevail.
对法国大革命的这一叙述使耶吉论证，观念和态度的变化总是嵌入于我们"伦理生活形式"的变化之中。耶吉细读了《资本论》中的一句话："从一个更高的社会经济形态的立场看，特定个人对土地的私有财产，将显得如同一个人对另一个人的私有财产一样缺乏品味。"耶吉指出，马克思赋予社会经济变化作为观念转变之催化剂的首要性，与他在1859年《序言》中发展的基础-上层建筑模型相一致。耶吉在希望保留马克思唯物主义的同时，与她所认为这一隐喻中隐含的因果优先性保持距离。她论证道，"我们道德想象中的变化……与其他社会变化一并产生并固化"。在此《进步与退步》也与罗蒂分道扬镳，对罗蒂而言，使奴隶制显得"缺乏品味"的转变与其说是社会经济变化的问题，不如说是改变了的感受性问题，这需要一种情感教育。耶吉同样将自己与安德森区分开来，安德森将奴隶制废除框定为围绕道德原则的历史争论过程的结果。耶吉既抵抗狭隘的决定论理解，也抵抗过度唯心主义的变迁理解，她写道：对被描述为道德进步的制度和实践评价的变化，并非源于自由漂浮的道德洞见或道德移情的独自运用。它是整个社会形态巨变的结果，是周围或相邻实践以及解释视域的转变——在这一视域内，相关的道德实践与信念得以成形并占据主导。
解析本段处理基础/上层建筑这一经典马克思主义命题的重构。耶吉以马克思《资本论》中"私有财产将显得缺乏品味"的引文为支点，但拒绝基础单向决定上层建筑的因果模型，主张观念与物质变化"一并产生并固化"。她同时与罗蒂（情感教育）和安德森（道德原则之争）划界，坚持道德变迁嵌入于整体社会形态的巨变。引文段落是全书方法论宣言：道德进步既非自由漂浮的观念，也非单纯的经济决定，而是"整个社会形态巨变"的结果。这一立场接近布迪厄的场域理论——道德变化是实践、信念与解释视域协同转型的产物。但"一并产生"的平行论是否足以解释变迁的方向性，仍是悬而未决的问题。
第14段
To illustrate the point, she turns to the criminalization of spousal rape in Germany in 1997. This did not come about due to an autonomous shift in ideas, or extension of empathy to married women. It rather required changes to a series of background conditions, which cast the phenomenon in a new light. Formerly justified in a context in which a husband had rights to his wife's physical property and control over her employment contract, spousal rape could only be challenged once these premises no longer held, thanks to the entry of women into the labour market, which was catalysed in part by the invention of the typewriter (with its promise of secretarial work) and by the dearth of male workers during the Second World War. It was these social changes that made a wife's fealty to her husband seem outdated. Gradually, a husband's right to his wife's body came to seem that way too. It is not only, then, as Appiah has argued, that moral revolutions are always embedded in a society's broader ethos (in his view, slavery became hard to justify in an early bourgeois society, with its strong valorization of labour). It is rather that morality is always bound up with changes occurring on an economic, technological, legal and intellectual level.
为说明这一点，她转向1997年德国婚内强奸的入罪化。这并非由于观念的自主转变，或对已婚妇女移情的扩展。它要求一系列背景条件的变化，这些变化使该现象呈现于新的光线下。此前，婚内强奸在丈夫对妻子身体财产拥有权利、对其就业合同拥有控制的语境中被正当化；只有当这些前提不再成立时，它才可能被挑战，这得益于女性进入劳动力市场——而这一进入部分由打字机的发明（带来秘书工作的前景）和二战期间男工短缺所催化。正是这些社会变化使妻子对丈夫的效忠显得过时。渐渐地，丈夫对妻子身体的权利也开始显得如此。因此，正如阿皮亚所论证的，不仅道德革命总是嵌入于一个社会更广阔的精神气质之中（在他看来，奴隶制在一个高度重视劳动的早期资产阶级社会中变得难以正当化），更确切地说，道德总是与经济、技术、法律和智识层面发生的变化交织在一起。
解析本段以婚内强奸入罪化为案例，实证耶吉的唯物主义道德进步观。该案例精妙之处在于其因果链条的复杂性：打字机发明到秘书工作到女性进入劳动力市场到妻子经济依附瓦解到丈夫对妻子身体的权利失去正当性基础到婚内强奸可被挑战。这一链条展示了技术、经济、法律与道德的协同变迁，有力反驳了纯粹观念论的解释。与阿皮亚的对照显示耶吉更强调物质基础的作用——阿皮亚仍以"社会精神气质"为中介，耶吉则追溯到技术与经济结构。但值得反思的是：这一因果叙事是否过度回溯性地建构？案例选择本身也可能带有确认偏误。
第15段
Jaeggi proposes a model of how this might occur, using four connected concepts—problems, crises, contradictions and conflicts. Problems are an ordinary, constant feature of any form of life (forms of life are 'inherently problem-driven, caught up in an ongoing problem-solving dynamic'). A crisis is a breakdown in the problem-solving process ('the reference system within which problems are normally solved has itself become problematic'). Contradictions have even 'more demanding implications': systematic and internal, they 'arise when a set of social practices is constituted in such a way that it systematically undermines itself'. Put schematically, social change for Jaeggi involves these escalating steps: first there is a crisis, an issue that a society cannot solve without massive transformation (say, the ecological crisis). In the midst of this crisis, fundamental contradictions emerge for the operative form of life (the fuel on which we depend is calamitously altering the natural environment). A crisis may then erupt into a conflict: 'a more or less violent disagreement between two or more parties'. Whereas a crisis is passive and objective, a conflict is subjective and active: it is the interpretation we give to a crisis (say, that the interests of fossil capital are at odds with the general interest). In the midst of a conflict, a set of options present themselves as 'latent resources' for social transformation (the development of fully renewable energy systems, the adoption of degrowth economic policies, and so on).
耶吉提出这一过程如何发生的模型，使用四个相互联系的概念——问题、危机、矛盾和冲突。问题是任何生活形式的普通的、恒常的特征（生活形式"本质上是由问题驱动的，卷入一个持续的问题解决动态"）。危机是问题解决过程的崩溃（"通常在其中解决问题的参照系统本身已成为问题"）。矛盾具有"更为苛刻的含义"：系统性和内在的，它们"当一套社会实践以一种系统性地自我破坏的方式被构成时产生"。图式化地说，对耶吉而言社会变迁涉及这些逐步升级的步骤：首先是危机，一个社会不经过大规模转型就无法解决的问题（比如生态危机）。在危机之中，现行生活形式的基本矛盾浮现（我们所依赖的燃料正灾难性地改变自然环境）。一场危机随后可能爆发为冲突："两个或更多方之间或多或少暴力的分歧"。危机是被动的和客观的，而冲突是主观的和主动的：它是我们赋予危机的解释（比如，化石资本的利益与普遍利益相悖）。在冲突之中，一组选项作为社会转型的"潜在资源"呈现自身（发展完全可再生的能源系统、采用去增长的经济政策等等）。
解析本段是全书的核心分析模型：问题-危机-矛盾-冲突的四级递进结构。这一模型综合了多个传统：问题解决取自实用主义，矛盾来自马克思主义，危机呼应法兰克福学派的危机理论，冲突则接近阿伦特的行动概念。生态危机的贯穿性例证使抽象模型具象化。关键区分在于危机（被动客观）与冲突（主观主动）——冲突是赋予危机以解释的政治行动。这一区分极为重要：它说明社会转型需要从客观危机向主观冲突的转化，而这一转化依赖解释与动员。但模型的局限在于：它预设了矛盾"系统性地自我破坏"的可识别性，而这本身可能需要规范判断——又回到"规范走私"问题。
第16段
If social transformation takes place in response to problems, how does Jaeggi define whether its direction is progressive or regressive? In line with her thinking in Critique of Forms of Life, change is progressive when it involves a 'self-enriching experiential learning process'. Inspired by Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, this is in many ways the crux of her theory. Such experiential learning involves a gain in self-consciousness: 'an expanded understanding of the situation and the self', as well as 'a correction of self-deceptions and biases'. More than an improvement, progress is 'a crisis-induced growth in reflexivity': 'It denotes not only a quantitative increase in knowledge and experience but also a qualitative intensification', as it always involves 'an element of learning how to learn'—and thus a movement towards 'developing the conditions that enable a process of emancipation'. When we make a progressive move in the face of a crisis, we consciously choose to learn from mistakes and so to 'increase the complexity' of our actions.
如果社会转型是回应问题而发生的，耶吉如何定义其方向是进步的还是退步的？与她在《生活形式批判》中的思路一致，当变化涉及一个"自我丰富的经验学习过程"时，它就是进步的。受黑格尔《精神现象学》启发，这在许多方面是她理论的关键。这种经验学习涉及自我意识的增益："对情境和自我的扩展理解"，以及"对自我欺骗和偏见的纠正"。进步不仅是改善，而是"一种危机诱发的反思性增长"："它不仅指知识和经验的定量增加，也指一种质性的强化"，因为它总涉及"学习如何学习的要素"——从而朝向"发展使解放过程得以可能的条件"的运动。当我们在面对危机时做出进步之举，我们有意识地选择从错误中学习，从而"增加"我们行动的"复杂性"。
解析本段给出进步的核心定义：危机诱发的反思性增长，即"自我丰富的经验学习过程"。黑格尔《精神现象学》是关键灵感源——精神在经验中通过否定自身而获得自我意识。耶吉将这一辩证学习过程社会学化，作为衡量进步的标准。"学习如何学习"的元学习概念尤为关键，它使进步成为开放过程而非接近既定目标。进步因此兼具定量（知识增加）与定性（反思性强化）维度，朝向"解放条件的发展"。但"解放"在此仍是未定义的终点——这恰是后文批判的焦点。值得注意的是，"复杂性"作为标准呼应了卢曼的系统理论，但其规范性基础未被论证。
第17段
Perhaps because of the abstraction of this definition, in considering how to apply it to real-world transformations, Jaeggi turns to regression, whose absence becomes a defining feature of progress. Regression is 'a kind of unlearning'—an inappropriate and inadequate form of crisis management. Jaeggi's final chapter explores this from a psychoanalytic standpoint—the field in which, as she points out, regression has 'gained lasting significance'. Understood in this register, the term denotes 'a relapse behind an already attained position': reverting to a more primitive, less structured, often child-like alternative. A regression is a strategy of avoidance and denial, and therefore is often understood as a roadblock to autonomy. In Jaeggi's argument, when we regress, we respond to problems unreflectively—seeking false solutions to 'critical changes that are experienced as threatening'. Here, Progress and Regression turns to Adorno's critique of nationalism, which he saw as a denial of the 'historically real, factual obsolescence of the nation-state paradigm'. To cling to the nation in reaction against the 'atomizing tendencies of modern industrial societies' is to avoid facing a changed context of transnational interdependence and globalization, by fetishizing a worn-out structure that no longer possesses emancipatory potential. Rather than an 'enlargement of experience', this is to resort to an irrational or rigid response that blocks 'the possibility of further experience on which the prospect of change depends'. Regressive solutions can be functional in a limited sense. As Jaeggi emphasizes throughout, it is the process, not the result, that matters philosophically. And there can be good recoveries of the past; Jaeggi acknowledges 'cases where a partial reprise—going back to the way things used to be done, breathing new life into defunct or long-dormant practices—may be deemed progressive'. (The Slow Food movement is one example.) The idea of regression is a criterion for distinguishing a valuable retrieval of a discarded practice from a damaging or inhibiting one.
或许因为这一定义的抽象性，在考虑如何将其应用于现实转型时，耶吉转向退步，其缺席成为进步的规定性特征。退步是"一种去学习"——一种不恰当且不充分的危机管理形式。耶吉的最后一章从精神分析视角探索这一点——在这一领域中，正如她指出的，退步"获得了持久意义"。在这一意义上理解，该词表示"退回到一个已获得的立场之后"：回归到一个更原始、更少结构化、常常是孩童式的替代方案。退步是一种回避和否认的策略，因此常被理解为自主性的路障。在耶吉的论证中，当我们退步时，我们不反思地回应问题——为"被体验为威胁的关键变化"寻求虚假解决方案。在此，《进步与退步》转向阿多诺对民族主义的批判，他将之视为对"民族国家范式在历史上真实的、事实上的过时"的否认。执着于民族以回应"现代工业社会的原子化倾向"，是通过恋物化一个不再拥有解放潜能的过时结构来回避跨国相互依赖和全球化这一已变语境。这不是"经验的扩展"，而是诉诸一种非理性或僵化的回应，它阻断了"进一步经验的可能性，而变革的前景正依赖于此"。退步性解决方案在有限意义上可以是功能性的。正如耶吉始终强调的，哲学上重要的是过程，而非结果。也可以有对过去的良好恢复；耶吉承认"那些部分性重拾——回到过去做事的方式，为废弃或长久沉寂的实践注入新生命——可能被视为进步的案例"。（慢食运动即是一例。）退步观念是区分一种有价值的对被弃实践的取回与一种有害或抑制性取回的标准。
解析本段是全书退步理论的核心。耶吉巧妙地将进步定义为"通过退步之缺席来规定"——这避免了正面定义进步的规范负担。精神分析视角的引入使"去学习""回避""否认"等概念获得深度。阿多诺的民族主义批判是关键案例：民族主义是对民族国家过时性的否认，是面对全球化时的退步性应对。但耶吉谨慎区分"退步"与"对过去的良性取回"（如慢食运动），这一区分至关重要却难以操作——其标准仍是"恰当"与"理性"等未奠基的词汇。"过程而非结果"的强调呼应非后果主义立场，但也带来实践困难：如何在事前判断某一取回是进步还是退步？这为后文的环境活动家困境埋下伏笔。
第18段
In her preface, Jaeggi says that her aim is 'to clarify conceptual questions for the purpose of practical orientation'. How, after reading Progress and Regression, might a political actor use such criteria in strategizing how to address a crisis? If an environmental activist had read the book and admired its arguments: what should she do when deciding whether to advocate for degrowth or a green new deal? Given that both are responses to a real crisis, they could not be described as regressive; each would present enriching opportunities for learning. Yet, in spite of Jaeggi's intended distance from consequentialism, a final evaluation could surely only occur with hindsight, or, at the very least, once the choice had already been made and tested out. Only once degrowth was under way could we assess it as a mode of problem-solving. If, for example, economic contraction ended up compromising the state's capacity to roll out necessary social services, it would have inhibited a form of life's capacity as a 'problem-solving entity', depleting the resources that it could address to other social issues.
在她的序言中，耶吉说她的目标是"为实践定向而澄清概念问题"。读完《进步与退步》之后，一位政治行动者如何运用这些标准来策划如何应对一场危机？如果一位环境活动家读了这本书并欣赏其论证：在决定是倡导去增长还是绿色新政时，她应该怎么做？鉴于两者都是对真实危机的回应，它们都不能被描述为退步性的；各自都会呈现丰富的学习机会。然而，尽管耶吉有意与后果主义保持距离，最终评估恐怕只能在事后进行，或者至少在选择已经做出并经受检验之后。只有当去增长已经展开，我们才能将其评估为一种问题解决模式。例如，如果经济收缩最终损害了国家提供必要社会服务的能力，它就将抑制一种生活形式作为"问题解决实体"的能力，耗尽它可用于其他社会议题的资源。
解析本段是作者对耶吉理论实践效力的直接检验。以环境活动家在去增长与绿色新政之间的选择为思想实验，作者揭示耶吉理论的根本困难：既然进步是"过程概念"且重视学习，两种回应都难以事前判定为退步，则标准只能在事后生效。这与耶吉声言的"实践定向"目标形成张力——若评估只能事后进行，则对行动者缺乏指导力。作者隐含指出：耶吉虽试图远离后果主义，但其"问题解决实体能力"的标准实质上依赖后果评估（经济收缩是否损害社会服务能力）。这一内在矛盾是全书最尖锐的批评之一，预示了"规范走私"的最终质疑。
第19段
The book concludes that the resurgence of 'various neo-authoritarian and neofascist movements' can fairly be judged regressive. These attempts to resolve the internal problems of liberalism repeat historically failed responses to crises; by returning to an inadequate form of crisis-management, they represent an 'inappropriate relation to reality'. But it is less clear how Jaeggi can show that fascism was already regressive at its emergence in the 1920s without smuggling in some other norms. Early on, defining progress as the 'quality' of a society's problem-solving leads Jaeggi to make an intriguing concession: changes for the better are not always progressive. Moral rightness, she suggests, should be evaluated separately from progress. As she puts it, from a purely normative standpoint, 'victory over fascism would still be morally right . . . if it had been engineered by little green men from outer space'. Progress, by contrast, is about the process. She uses mountain-climbing as an example: you would not call it 'progress' if you reached the summit by helicopter. But this raises the question of what principles underlie these moral judgements instead.
全书结论是，"各种新威权主义和新法西斯主义运动"的复兴可以公正地被判定为退步性的。这些解决自由主义内部问题的尝试重复了历史上对危机的失败回应；通过回到不充分的危机管理形式，它们代表了一种"与现实的不恰当关系"。但耶吉如何能表明法西斯主义在1920年代兴起时已经是退步性的，而不走私某些其他规范，则不那么清楚。早先，将进步定义为社会问题解决的"质量"使耶吉做出一个引人注目的让步：向好的变化并不总是进步的。她建议，道德正当性应与进步分开评估。正如她所言，从纯粹规范立场看，"战胜法西斯主义仍会是道德上正当的……即便它是由外太空的小绿人所策划的"。进步，相比之下，关乎过程。她以登山为例：如果你是乘直升机到达山顶的，你不会称之为"进步"。但这引出了一个问题：到底是什么原则支撑着这些道德判断。
解析本段直击"规范走私"质疑的核心。作者以法西斯主义为例：耶吉判定其为退步，但1920年代法西斯主义初起时，如何在不引入外在规范的情况下判定其退步性？耶吉的关键让步——道德正当性与进步分离——表面上化解了问题，实则加深了困境。"小绿人"之喻说明道德正当性可不依赖过程，但这一分离恰恰使道德判断的标准成为空白。登山喻（直升机登顶非进步）强化了过程论，但"道德判断基于什么原则"的追问正是全文核心质疑。作者在此明确点题：耶吉将规范问题悬置，却仍在做规范性判断，这就是"规范走私"。
第20段
Jaeggi is aware of the many different traps into which her argument might fall: too materialist, too idealist, too essentialist, too consequentialist. Her hope is that describing progress as an open process of collective learning and problem-solving can be capacious and pluralist enough to avoid making judgements using norms that aren't necessarily shared. Yet however subtle, the attempt to skirt these criticisms via a 'deflation' of the concept can sometimes seem excessively abstract—'a meta-category of social change', as Jaeggi herself puts it, which risks emptying it of practical substance. At other times, one wonders whether Jaeggi's 'processual concept' can entirely avoid taking any substantive positions. A 'true north of progress' may be necessary after all. Progress and Regression uses concepts like learning, reflexivity and complexity as grounding criteria, without grounding them in turn. Is reflexivity an incontestable good? Is complexity?
耶吉意识到她的论证可能落入的许多不同陷阱：太唯物主义、太唯心主义、太本质主义、太后果主义。她的希望是，将进步描述为集体学习和问题解决的开放过程，可以足够宽广和多元主义，以避免使用未必被共享的规范来做判断。然而无论多么精妙，通过概念的"通缩"来规避这些批评的尝试，有时显得过度抽象——"社会变迁的一个元范畴"，正如耶吉自己所言，这有可能掏空其实践实质。在另一些时候，人们不禁要问，耶吉的"过程概念"能否完全避免采取任何实质性立场。"进步的真北"也许终究是必要的。《进步与退步》使用学习、反思性和复杂性等概念作为奠基性标准，却没有反过来为它们奠基。反思性是不容置疑的善吗？复杂性呢？
解析本段是作者正面质疑耶吉的理论根基。"四个太"（唯物/唯心/本质/后果）概括了耶吉试图同时回避的陷阱，但作者指出"通缩"策略本身可能导致过度抽象——沦为"社会变迁的元范畴"而失去实践实质。最尖锐的追问是末尾两个反问："反思性是不容置疑的善吗？复杂性呢？"这直指耶吉未加论证的规范性预设。学习、反思性、复杂性被用作奠基性标准却自身未被奠基，这正是"规范走私"的具体形式。作者暗示，或许"进步的真北"（实质标准）终究不可避免——这与耶吉的"通缩"雄心直接冲突。
第21段
More anodyne normative vocabulary also sneaks into the book. Jaeggi frequently uses the terms 'appropriate' and 'rational' and their opposites ('regression is a kind of inappropriate relation to reality'; a crisis occurs when we lack 'appropriate measures' to address problems). This prompts the question not only of what counts as 'appropriate', but of the source of the authority of the evaluation. We might wish to call nationalism regressive insofar as it denies the reality of the internationalized world order; but on that basis, shouldn't utopian strains of socialism be accused of denying the reality of capitalist hegemony? Such terms suggest Jaeggi has not so much eradicated normative standards as displaced them into a new vocabulary. Perhaps most fundamentally, this raises a question about her use of 'emancipation', another key term, sometimes used as a virtual synonym for progress, and at one point described as 'the vanishing point for understanding both progress and regression'. Most of the book's examples of progressive change derive from struggles for emancipation, whether by enslaved people or by women. Though an indication of what Jaeggi might mean by emancipation emerges in Critique of Forms of Life, where it is framed as 'the practical development' of 'self-determined living conditions', she does not elaborate on the concept in Progress and Regression. It seems that emancipation may have silently become the very standard that we need to distinguish progress from regression. But if we have such a standard, are we back to square one?
更为温和的规范词汇也悄然潜入书中。耶吉频繁使用"恰当的"和"理性的"及其反义词（"退步是一种与现实的不恰当关系"；当我们缺乏解决问题的"恰当措施"时，危机便发生）。这引发的问题不仅是什么算作"恰当"，还有评估权威的来源。我们或许希望称民族主义是退步的，就其否认国际化世界秩序的现实而言；但在那一基础上，乌托邦式的社会主义难道不应被指控否认资本主义霸权的现实吗？这些术语表明，耶吉并未如此根除规范标准，而是将其移置到一个新的词汇中。或许最根本的是，这引发了一个关于她使用"解放"的问题——另一个关键术语，有时几乎被用作进步的同义词，并在某处被描述为"理解进步与退步两者的消失点"。书中大多数进步性变化的例子源于解放斗争，无论是被奴役者还是女性的斗争。尽管耶吉所谓解放的意涵在《生活形式批判》中有所显现——被框定为"自我决定的生活条件"的"实践发展"——她在《进步与退步》中并未详细阐释这一概念。看来解放可能已悄然成为我们区分进步与退步所需的那个标准。但如果我们有这样一个标准，我们是否又回到了原点？
解析本段是"规范走私"质疑的全面展开。作者捕捉到耶吉频繁却未加反思使用的规范词汇——"恰当""理性"，并犀利指出：若民族主义因否认国际秩序而是退步的，那么乌托邦社会主义否认资本主义霸权是否同样退步？这一反诘揭示了"与现实恰当关系"标准的任意性。更根本的是"解放"概念的暗中运作：耶吉的进步案例几乎都源于解放斗争，"解放"成为事实上的区分标准，却未被显式奠基。"是否回到原点"的追问是全文论证的高潮——若解放已是潜在标准，则耶吉的"通缩"努力便成循环：她以避免规范标准为名，实则暗中使用了最古典的解放规范。这正是书名"Norm Smuggling"的最终落点。
第22段
The broader aspiration of Jaeggi's work to resuscitate controversial concepts is always salutary. She has located a real problem and named several major pitfalls in prior attempts to address it; her comparative, non-prescriptive approach is sensitive and sophisticated. Yet though an impressive display of philosophical reasoning, it is not clear that Progress and Regression is able to achieve its objectives. It would seem that if we want to retain the idea of progress, we need to be able to appeal to a substantive standard—whether emancipation or something else. The task lies in identifying and grounding that standard's features.
耶吉复兴争议性概念的更宏大志向始终是可嘉的。她定位了一个真实问题，并指出了此前试图解决该问题的若干重大陷阱；她的比较性、非规范性的进路敏感而精巧。然而，尽管这是一次令人印象深刻的哲学推理展示，《进步与退步》能否实现其目标并不清楚。似乎如果我们想保留进步观念，我们就需要能够诉诸一个实质性标准——无论是解放还是别的什么。任务在于识别并奠基那一标准的特征。
解析本段是全文结语，作者给出了平衡而明确的最终评价。肯定耶吉的问题意识与方法论的敏感精巧，但判定其目标未能实现。核心论断是：保留进步观念需要实质性标准，而耶吉的"通缩"策略无法回避这一要求。"无论是解放还是别的什么"暗示标准的具体内容可商，但其必要性不容回避。末句"识别并奠基那一标准的特征"既是对耶吉的批评，也是对未来批判理论的议程设定。整体而言，作者既尊重耶吉的哲学贡献，又坚持批判理论的规范奠基要求，体现了NLR书评一贯的严肃理论品格。
二、全文点评
三、相关思想脉络
相关思想脉络
法兰克福学派的代际传承与进步概念
法兰克福学派的社会批判理论自创立之初便与"进步"问题深刻纠缠。第一代（霍克海默、阿多诺）在《启蒙辩证法》中揭示了工具理性进步的辩证反转——理性解放潜能蜕变为统治手段，进步与退步在启蒙内部合谋。第二代哈贝马斯试图以交往理性重建解放潜能，主张启蒙原则蕴含"规范剩余"，进步在于兑现其隐含承诺。第三代霍耐斯以"为承认而斗争"重构道德进步，强调承认关系的扩展与深化。耶吉作为第四代，既承继这一传统（尤以霍耐斯为直接师承），又试图超越其"规范剩余"模型——她追问新规范如何生成，而非仅是旧规范的展开。这一谱系使《进步与退步》成为批判理论自我反思的关键节点。
启蒙进步观及其解构：从科泽勒克到后殖民批评
耶吉的概念重建以历史化为前提。她直接借鉴莱因哈特·科泽勒克的概念史研究——《"进步"与"衰落"》勾勒了"进步"作为现代集合概念的形成史。启蒙进步观的核心假定——科学、道德、政治进步的统一联动、历史必然性、进化阶段论、线性累积——在十九世纪成为霸权意识形态，恰为殖民扩张提供正当化。二十世纪后期的解构来自多方向：后结构主义（福柯）质疑进步的权力效应对，后殖民理论（萨义德、查克拉巴蒂）揭露其族裔中心主义，法兰克福学派则揭示技术进步与道德退步的辩证共生。耶吉的特殊姿态在于：她接受全部批评，却拒绝福柯式的彻底放弃，转而寻求"挽救式重建"。
"厚重伦理概念"传统：从威廉斯到耶吉
耶吉将进步界定为"伦理上厚重的概念"，这一理论资源可追溯至伯纳德·威廉斯。威廉斯区分"薄的"伦理概念（如"善""义务"，纯评价性）与"厚的"伦理概念（如"勇敢""残酷"，兼具描述与评价双重功能）。厚概念的世界观依赖性使其在后形而上学时代仍保有批判力。耶吉将"进步""异化""媚俗"归入此类，意在表明：即便无法提供先验规范，这类概念仍因其描述-评价的双重性而具有"特有的解释力"。这一策略使她能在不诉诸绝对标准的前提下保留批判性。但Ebner-Landy的质疑恰恰指向此处：厚概念的评价维度本身已蕴含规范，"挽救"概念而不挽救其规范基础，是否可能？
实用主义与批判理论的会通：杜威、基切尔
耶吉对实用主义的吸纳是其在法兰克福学派传统中最具创新性的转向。杜威的问题解决取向直接体现于"社会没有目标，它们解决问题"这一纲领性命题。杜威将智识视为应对环境问题的工具，进步不在于接近先验目的，而在于经验累积带来的问题解决能力增长。耶吉进一步引入菲利普·基切尔在科学哲学中的"脱离的进步"（progress from）概念——进步不是朝向既定真理的逼近，而是摆脱既有困境的超越。这一实用主义转向使耶吉得以摆脱目的论负担，但也带来风险：当"问题"本身的界定缺乏规范基准时，"问题解决"的标准便可能滑向功能主义——能"解决"问题的就是进步，而何为问题却无从判定。
精神分析的退步概念：从弗洛伊德到阿多诺
耶吉将退步概念的核心建立在精神分析之上。弗洛伊德将退步定义为"退回到已获立场之后"——面对威胁时回归更原始、更少结构化的应对模式，是一种回避与否认策略。这一概念在个体层面指向自主性的路障。耶吉的天才之处在于将其社会学化：以阿多诺对民族主义的批判为范式，将退步扩展至集体层面——民族主义是对民族国家过时性的集体否认，是面对全球化时的退步性应对。这一精神分析-批判理论的融合，使"退步"获得了远超日常"倒退"用法的理论深度。但精神分析的退步概念本身预设了"成熟"与"原始"的规范等级，将这一预设无声移入社会理论，恰是"规范走私"的另一种形式。
道德进步理论的当代谱系：罗蒂、安德森、辛格、阿皮亚
《进步与退步》系统对话了当代道德进步理论的四大代表。罗蒂以"情感教育"解释道德进步——奴隶制废除源于感受性的转变而非经济决定，进步是情感扩展的故事。安德森将道德进步框定为围绕道德原则的历史争论过程。辛格与沃尔泽共享"包容性扩展"模型——进步是尊严承载者范围的逐步扩大。阿皮亚强调道德革命嵌入于社会精神气质（如资产阶级对劳动的重视使奴隶制难以正当化）。耶吉对四者均有批评：罗蒂过于唯心，安德森忽视物质基础，辛格/沃尔泽无法解释新规范之生成、且隐含居高临下姿态，阿皮亚仍以"精神气质"为中介而未深入经济结构。耶吉的唯物主义立场试图综合其洞见而克服其局限。
新黑格尔主义的规范剩余：霍耐斯与哈贝马斯
耶吉最接近的理论坐标是新黑格尔主义的"规范剩余"模型。哈贝马斯主张启蒙原则（平等、自由）对将来持有未被穷尽的规范潜能，进步在于兑现其隐含承诺——如婚姻从父权所有制走向平等结合，是启蒙原则的"质性深化"与"制度性落实"。霍耐斯的承认理论进一步将此动力学扩展至承认关系的三维结构（爱、法权、团结）。耶吉认同这一模型的动态辩证性——"理想在被实现中转化"——但指出其根本缺陷：无法解释新规范最初的"有效性声称"之起源。法国大革命的例子表明，激进变革总以恢复旧形式为起点，"革命总也是恢复"。这一批评既是对师承的超越，也指向批判理论的核心难题：规范的规范性从何而来？
规范奠基之争：哈贝马斯的"后形而上学"难题
Ebner-Landy书评的深层意涵，指向批判理论自哈贝马斯以来未决的根本问题：在"后形而上学"条件下，规范如何奠基？哈贝马斯以话语伦理学回应——规范的有效性来自理性对话程序，而非先验形而上学。霍耐斯以承认关系为规范基础。耶吉的"通缩"策略则是最新尝试：以"内在标准"和"过程概念"避免任何实质规范，让进步标准从问题解决过程中内生。Ebner-Landy的质疑表明这一策略面临循环——"恰当""理性""学习""反思性""复杂性"乃至"解放"等词汇在事实上承担了规范功能，却未被显式奠基。"规范走私"的指控本质上是说：绕过规范奠基是不可能的，任何具有批判力的进步概念都已预设了某种善的观念。这一争论远未结束，它将继续定义批判理论的未来议程。
全文点评
Katie Ebner-Landy对Rahel Jaeggi《进步与退步》的书评，以"Norm Smuggling?"（规范走私？）为题，精准地抓住了这部著作的核心张力：一部旨在以"非规范性"方式复兴进步概念的书，是否在暗中引入了它声称要避免的规范标准？这一质疑贯穿全文，构成了书评最尖锐也最具生产性的批判线索。
耶吉的学术位置本身就值得关注。作为法兰克福学派第四代代表人物，她承继了从霍克海默、阿多诺到哈贝马斯、霍耐斯的批判理论传统，但其独特之处在于大胆引入实用主义（杜威）与精神分析（弗洛伊德）资源，试图构建一个"非目的论的、实用主义-唯物主义的、多元主义的进步概念"。这一综合雄心令人印象深刻——西方马克思主义的结构动力、实用主义的偶然性与问题解决取向、精神分析对过去持存的关注，三者本不易调和，耶吉却以三组马克思主义经典对立（改良/革命、基础/上层建筑、社会主义/野蛮）为载体进行了系统性重构。
全书最精彩之处在于其概念重建的方法论自觉。耶吉借鉴科泽勒克的概念史研究，首先刻画启蒙进步观的四个特征（整体联动、非人格必然、进化阶段、线性累积），逐一回应其合法批评，再以"线团"取代"铁链"、以"处境化行动者"取代"世界历史主体"、以"问题解决"取代"进化目标"、以"副作用可化解"取代"无损失累积"。"社会没有目标，它们解决问题"这一实用主义命题，以及"脱离的进步"取代"朝向的进步"的转换，构成了全书最具启发性的理论贡献。问题-危机-矛盾-冲突的四级模型，则为社会转型提供了精细的分析装置。
然而，Ebner-Landy的批评切中要害。第一个根本困难是实践效力：耶吉声言要为"实践定向"澄清概念，但其"过程概念"使进步评估只能在事后生效。环境活动家面对去增长与绿色新政的选择时，无法事前依据耶吉的标准做出判断——两者都是对真实危机的回应，都呈现学习机会。这一"事后性"与"实践定向"的目标之间存在不可调和的张力。若评估只能事后进行，则理论对行动者缺乏指导力，其"关键概念工具"的自我定位便落空。
第二个、也是更根本的困难，正是书名所指的"规范走私"。耶吉试图通过"通缩"——将进步形式化为"变化的形式"——来避免引入未共享的规范。但Ebner-Landy揭示，规范标准并未被根除，而是被移置到新词汇中。"恰当""理性"等词汇频繁出现却未加反思；"反思性""复杂性""学习"被用作奠基性标准却自身未被奠基。最关键的是"解放"概念：书中进步案例几乎都源于解放斗争，"解放"在事实上已成为区分进步与退步的潜在标准，却被悬置未加阐释。作者犀利地追问："如果我们有这样一个标准，我们是否又回到了原点？"——若解放已是潜在标准，则耶吉的全部"通缩"努力便成循环：以避免规范为名，实则使用了最古典的解放规范。
第三个困难涉及历史判断的连贯性。耶吉判定新法西斯主义为退步，但如何在不引入外在规范的情况下，证明1920年代法西斯主义初起时已是退步？她以"道德正当性与进步分离"来化解（战胜法西斯主义即便由"小绿人"完成也是道德正当的），但这一分离恰恰使道德判断的标准成为空白。登山喻（直升机登顶非进步）强化了过程论，却无法回答"道德判断基于什么原则"的追问。
尽管如此，书评对耶吉的评价是平衡的。Ebner-Landy肯定其问题意识真实、方法论敏感精巧、比较性进路成熟。她的批评并非否定，而是指出批判理论若要保留进步观念，终究需要诉诸实质性标准——"无论是解放还是别的什么"。这一判断既是对耶吉的具体批评，也是对当代批判理论的议程设定：在"后形而上学"时代，规范奠基如何可能？这是哈贝马斯以降未决的根本问题，耶吉的"通缩"策略是绕过它的最新尝试，而Ebner-Landy的书评则有力地表明：绕过或许不可能，直面才是出路。